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REALIGNMENT OF PARTIES IN STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVA-
TIVE SUITS WHERE JURISDICTION IS BASED UPON
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit an aggrieved stock-
holder to sue his corporation and one he alleges to be liable to
that corporation in a single suit in Equity, thereby asserting rights
that are derived from those of the corporation.' The corporation,
in this action is an essential, not a nominal party.2 When the basis
for jurisdiction in the federal courts is diversity of citizenship
the question arises: .what is the proper location of the corporation
in regard to being a party plaintiff or defendant? This is crucial,
for the courts since the case of Strawbridge v. Curtis' have required
that all plaintiffs must be diverse as to all defendants. Many cases
arise where the citizenship of the corporation will be the same
as that of the other defendants, and the plaintiff-stockholder will
be diverse as to both; or the citizenship of the stockholder and
that of .the corporation will be identical, while the third party
will have a different situs of citizenship. In the former situation,
the case is cognizable in a court of Equity in the federal system,
while in the latter it will not be removable by the defendant to
a federal court, provided the court does not realign the corpora-
tion as a party plaintiff.
What then determines the proper location of the corporation
in a stockholder's derivative suit where the sole basis for federal
jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship? The court will not take
cognizance of the alignment made by the parties where it appears
that the suit is one that is collusively made with the purpose of
manufacturing federal court jurisdiction.' Thus, if the court finds
that the corporation and the stockholder are joined in their desire
to prosecute the action, the court will realign the corporation as
a party plaintiff.5' In that case if diversity of citizenship is the
sole basis for jurisdiction, the court must dismiss upon the rule
in Strawbridge v. Curtis.'
1. Fed.'R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
2. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161 (1946); Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
626 (1873); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 132 Fed. 252 (C.C.N.J. 1904).
3. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 states: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
5. See Helm v. Zaracor, 222 U.S. 32, 36 (1911). The Supreme Court said in this in-
stance: "It was, undoubtedly, the duty of the Court in determining whether there was the
requisite diversity of citizenship to arrange the parties with respect to the actual contro-
versy, looking beyond the formal arrangement made by the bill."
6. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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But what constitutes collusion that will destroy the alignment
made by the parties to the action? The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as did Equity Rule 94 under the older rules of practice,7
require an allegation under oath that the action is not collusive in
order to confer jurisdiction., In addition, the federal courts are
forbidden from taking cognizance of a civil action in which a
party has been collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction
of that court,9 and such a defect may be considered at any time
in the course of the trial. 1° Collusion essentially becomes an ele-
ment of fact that a party may present to the court or the court
may take up on its own motion," and if the elements of collusion
are found, the court will be without jurisdiction to consider the
action.
The requirements have supposedly been more strict, however,
than mere realignment upon the basis of known collusion. In an
effort to restrict federal diversity jurisdiction, the courts have
required that there be an "actual", 2 "substantial"," coptroversy
between each plaintiff and each defendant. It may easily be seen
that while the stockholder is suing for the enforcement of his
rights, the result of a successful lawsuit will accrue directly to
the benefit of the corporation, and only incidentally to the stock-
holder. Accordingly, the rule has been developed that the actual
.and substantial controversy between the stockholder and cor-
poration must be one "in which the corporation is disabled from
protecting itself","1 or the management of that corporation assumes
a "hostile attitude" 15 towards the stockholder. The exact import
of these terms had not become apparent until the Supreme Court
was presented with the question of whether an honest difference
of opinion will suffice to create a substantial and actual controversy
between these parties.
This problem was raised recently in two decisions of the Su-
preme Court: Smith v. Sperling" and Swanson v. Traer" were
7. Equity Rule 94, Promulgated January 23, 1882, 104 U.S. IX, later Equity Rule 27.
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b). "... the complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver
* . . (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States
jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction."
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1359.
10. Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887).
11. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). The
federal courts also have power to search the entire record to attack jurisdiction; Sun Printing
& Publishing Ass'n. v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377 (1904).
12. See Helm v. Zaricor, 222 U.S. 32 (1911).
13. See Niles Remont-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulder's Union, 254 U.S. 77 (1920).
14. Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 523 (1947).
15. Cutting v. Woodward, 255 Fed. 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1918).
16. 77 S. Ct. 1112 (1957).
17. 77 S. Ct. 1116 (1957).
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considered together by the Court. In the former, plaintiff, a citizen
of New York, brought an action as a stockholder of Warner Bros.
Pictures Inc., a Delaware citizen for purposes' of determining
diversity jurisdiction," against Warner Bros. and United States
Pictures Inc., another Delaware corporation. Plaintiff alleged that
one Harry Warner and his brothers controlled said Warner Bros.
corporation, and that they caused that company to enter into an
agreement with United States Pictures, a corporation solely owned
by Sperling, for the production of motion pictures that was "upon
terms improvident and unfair as to Warner Bros., and unwarrantedly
favorable to United."l" The district court held a preliminary trial
to determine the motive of the defendants Warners, and found
that they were in no way in control of the corporation, and had
at all times acted in good faith "for the best present and future
financial interests of the corporation .... " The court accordingly
realigned the defendant Warner Bros. with the plaintiff, and dis-
missed the cause of action for want of jurisdiction.
20
The latter case involved certain citizens of Nevada as plaintiffs,
against their corporation, the Chicago North Shore and Milwaukee
Railway Company, an Illinois citizen, and certain other Illinois
citizens, who were formally directors of the defendant railroad.
Plaintiff requested the corporation to sue these directors upon a
supposed breach of their fiduciary duties, but the present man-
agement, upon advice of counsel, refused. After plaintiff brought
this action', the corporation appeared and supported the case of
the other defendants. The corporation expressed the view they
wished as quick and speedy a determination of the trial as possible,
and doubted any possibility of recovery by the plaintiff. Aside
from that statement, the corporation remained neutral. The district
court held that the railway company must be realigned as a party
plaintiff, destroying diversity jurisdiction.
21
The Supreme Court upheld federal diversity jurisdiction in both
these cases. In their opinion, fraud on the part of the management
of the corporation was not necessary to show an actual controversy
between the corporation and the stockholder. 22 Antagonism, used
18. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (1 How:) 314 (1854). For diversity
of citizenship purposes, a corporation is treated as a citizdn of the state of incorporation
by a conclusive presumption that the suit is really one against the stockholder and that the
stockholders are all citizens of the state of incorporation.
19. 117 F. Supp. 781, 786 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
20. 117 F. Supp. 781 (S.D. Cal. 1953), aff'd. 237 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. granted, 352 U.S. 865 (1956).
21. 230 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, .352 U.S. 865 (1956).
22. 77 S. Ct. 1112 (1957).
19581 NOTES
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in many previous decisions upholding diversity jurisdiction in
stockholder's suits, does not necessarily connote wrongdoing, but
may result from an honest difference of opinion, where the cor-
poration defends a course of conduct that the stockholder opposes..
2
3
The capacity to maintain a stockholder's suit of this nature depends
upon local law since the decision in Erie v. Tompkins; 24 questions
of the jurisdiction of the federal courts rests upon federal law.
If the Court adopts the procedure of the lower court in Smith v.
Sperling, there would have to be two trials of the basic issue
of wrongdoing, one upon local and one upon federal law.25 On
this aspect, the Court said: "To stop and try the charge of wrong-
doing is to delve into the merits. . . . It is a time consuming,
wasteful exertion of energy upon a preliminary issue in the case."2e
They further pointed out that collusion can always be shown, at
any time in the trial, and said "absent collusion there is diversity
jurisdiction when the real collusion of issues . . . is between
citizens of different states."2 -, An honest difference of opinion is
such a collusion.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Burton, Harlan, and
Whittaker, dissented in an opinion based upon their belief that
the majority had "overturned a half-century's precedents"2 in
arriving at their decision, thus making the "exception the rule".
2
1
They charged that the majority had misconstrued precedent in
determining that antagonistic control includes an honest difference
of opinion; that jurisdiction in such a stockholder's suit is reserved
to that class of cases where the corporation, because of fraud on
the part of its management, is incapacitated from acting for itself,
and the stockholder is allowed to sue somewhat as a "next friend"3
The dissenters indicated that there was constitutional objection,
saying that it would be an "... unconstitutional invasion of the juris-
diction of the state courts-for a federal court to sustain federal
jurisdiction of a civil action between private persons . . . when
diversity of citizenship as to the 'matter in controversy' does not
exist.""'
23. Ibid.
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1948).
25. 117 F.Supp. 781 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
26. 77 S. Ct. 1112, 1115 (1957).
27. Id. at 1116.
28. 77 S. Ct. 1119 (1957).
29. Ibid.
30. Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 523 (1947).
31. See note 28 supra at 1126.
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Since the majority and the minority opinions cited the same
cases in support of their views, it is necessary to consider a few
of these cases to develop a sound concept of the basis of this type
of jurisdiction. The first important decision in this field arose
before the courts were given power to look behind the pleadings
to determine the proper alignment of the parties, 3 2 but it is good
law on the basis of the right to sue where the corporation is
deemed to be in antagonistic hands.", Stemming from that doc-
trine, but with the added power to look beyond the arrangement
of the parties, the cases decided by the Supreme Court have gener-
ally broken down into two classifications: (1) those where juris-
diction was upheld on the basis of an alleged fraudulent action
by the management of the corporation, evincing an attack not only
upon the third party but also upon the management, and (2) the
cases where jurisdiction has been found lacking because of collu-
sion between the, stockholder and the management of the cor-
poration, or for failure to allege absence of collusion in complying
with pleading rules.
Illustrative of the former line of cases is the oft-quoted decision
of Doctor v. Harrington.3 4 There the Supreme Court upheld diver-
sity jurisdiction where it appeared that a majority stockholder had
delivered to another corporation a promissory note for no consider-
ation, and later levied upon the capital stock of the new cor-
poration in the hands of the plaintiff's corporation to satisfy the
note. Regarding the problem of antagonistic control, the Court
said: "The ultimate interest of the corporation made defendant
may be the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff, but
the corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and
made to act in a way detrimental to his rights. In other words,
his interests, and the interest of the corporation, may be made
subservient to some illegal purpose. If a controversy hence arise,
and the other conditions of jurisdiction exist, it can be litigated
in a federal court.."3
5
32. 18 Stat. 470 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1948).
33. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
34. 196 U.S. 579 (1905); See also Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Corp., 330 U.S.
518 (1947); Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161 (1945); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44
(1922); Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S. R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909); Schimdt V.
Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954); Lavin v. Lavin, 182 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.
1950); Gratz v. Murchison, 130 F. Supp. 709 (D. Del. 1955); Ashley v. Keith Oil Co.,
73 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1947); J.R.A. Corp. v. Boylan, 30 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1939); Nagle v. Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp., 10 F. Supp. 905 (M.D. Pa. 1935); Harris V.
Brown, 6 F.2d 922 (W.D. Ky. 1925); Groel v. United Electric Co., 132 Fed. 252
(C.C.N.J. 1904).
35. Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 587 (1904).
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Again, in Venner v. Great Northern Railway Co.,311 the Court
was faced with an allegation in the complaint that the president,
James J. Hill, had made a secret profit at the expense of the stock-
holders of the railroad. The court below found that the plaintiff
had not complied with Equity Rule 94, and for that reason the
court was without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing that the proper jurisdictional elements were present, and that
failure to comply with a rule of pleading such as Rule 94 was
not jurisdictional, but went to the merits.
The second group of cases, where jurisdiction is denied because
of collusion between the corporation and the stockholder is typified
by Niles Bemont-Pond Company v. Iron Moulders Union Local
#68.3 7 A stockholder sued his corporation and a local labor union,
praying for an injunction to prevent the union from molesting
workers who attempted to cross picket lines. The Court found
collusion in the fact that the plaintiff was the majority stockholder
of the defendant corporation and could easily have brought the
action directly through the corporation. In a similar case,3" the
suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over a collusive action
where it was found by the court that the plaintiff had maneuvered
his request upon the board of directors to comply with Equity
Rule .94, solely to maintain an action in the federal courts. The
Court here said: ". . . he [the stockholder] must show a clear
breach of duty on their [directors, management] part in neglecting
or refusing to act in the matter, amounting to such grossly culp-
able conduct as would lead to irremediable loss to to him if he
were not permitted to bring the matter before the courts. And
such neglect and refusal must not be simulated, but real and
persisted in, after earnest efforts to overcome it."3 9
Hawes v. City of Oakland-° is a leading case on this subject and
was cited by both the majority and minority opinions in the
Swanson and Sperling cases, the majority distinguishing it, and
the minority relying upon it. The Court there found circumstances
indicating that the sole remedy was directed towards the City of
36. 209 U.s. 24 (1908).
37. 254 U.S. 77 (1920). See also Chase National Bank of City of New York v. Indian-
apolis, 314 U.S. 63 (1941); Hamer v. N.Y. Rys., 244 U.S. 266 (1917); Dawson v. Col-
ombia Ave. Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905); Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28
(1901).
38. Detroit v. Dean, 106 U.S. 537 (1882).
39. Id. at 542.
40. 104 U.S. 450 (1881) "The court laid down the requirements a stockholder must
meet to bring the action in his own name in a derivative suit. These requirements differ frons
the requirements of jurisdiction, as carefully explained in Venner v. Great No. By., 209
U.S. 24 (1908). Failing to comply with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 223 .(b),
which is based on Hawes v. Oakland, goes to the merits, not to jurisdiction.
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Oakland, and not towards the corporation. No allegation of fraud
was present, only a refusal to sue on the part of the board of
directors, but there were hints of collusion which the court alluded
to, and they dismissed the action for want of equity, not juris-
diction. However, to distinguish from the Swanson and Sperling
cases, it must be mentioned that the Court cited with approval the
English doctrine of MacDougall v. Gardiner,41 and quoted from
that case saying: " . . . nothing connected with internal disputes
between shareholders is to be made the subject of a bill by
some one shareholder on behalf of himself and others, unless
there be something illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent ..... The
Court also quoted with approval Dodge v. Woolsey.4"
Thus it will be seen that numerous statements occur throughout
the cases to the effect that bad faith is a necessary element in a
stockholder's derivative suit; where jurisdiction was upheld bad
faith was present but where jurisdiction, was denied, bad faith
was not determinative, as collusion or something very near to it
existed, which would deny the power of the court to hear the
case in any event.
Very few cases on alignment of parties for diversity purposes
in derivative suits have appeared between the two named classi-
fications; fraud or bad faith on one hand, and collusion on the other.
By the way of a dicta in the case of Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc.,
43
a lower court held that a refusal on the part of the management
to sue need not stem from improper motives. In Groel v. United
Electric Company44 the test was laid down that such a suit as
here contemplated would be allowed "... whenever the officers or
persons controlling the corporation are shown to be opposed to
the object sought by the complaining stockholder . . ." But in
the latter case there was an allegation of bad faith on the part
of management of the corporation, and jurisdiction would have
been upheld in absence of the word opposition even if construed
to include a good faith difference of opinion. The Supreme Court
of the United States decided a case that fit into this category
upon its facts, in Hill v. Wallace.4 5 A stockholder had requested
his board of directors to bring suit to test the validity of a statute,
and they had refused. Chief Justice Taft stated that the refusal
in this case was not an error in judgment in view of the fact that
41. 1 Ch. D. 13 (1875).
42. See note 33 supra.
43. 210 F.2d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 1954).
44. 132 Fed. 252, 264 (C.C.N.J. 1904).
45. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
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the law so seriously affected the value of the stock held by the
stockholders that such refusal was a breach of duty, though not
involving "moral delinquency."( Thus, it would seem that the
case merely followed the prior cases in their test of bad faith, and
indeed, the Court cited Dodge v. Woolsey as controlling. On the
other hand, the Court, in Chicago v. Mills, 4 7 found that there was
a mere "difference of opinion" between one stockholder and the
board of directors as to the advisability of bringing suit, but there
was nevertheless collusion between the corporation and the stock-
holder on an understanding of all facts leading up to suit. Thus
it may be seen that no case has come into the federal courts
quite on "all fours" with the cases of Smith v. Sperling and Swanson
v. Traer, though the courts have completely surrounded the prob-
lem with dicta.
There are a number of considerations that would strongly affect
the attitude of a practicing attorney. In the view taken by the
district court in Smith v. Sperling a separate trial would be neces-
sary whenever a plaintiff alleged bad faith on the part of the
management, and this trial would have to be decided on federal
law as being a matter of procedure, not substance.4 This trial
would very likely duplicate the matters to be considered on a trial
of the substantive elements of the controversy, decided on local
law. The trial in the Sperling case lasted fifteen days, and revealed
only that under federal law the. defendant had acted in the utmost
good faith. 40 Therefore, the plaintiff is thrown out of the federal
courts on a matter preliminary to the basic problem only to con-
tinue his litigation in the state court if he persistsi t The Sperling
case had been in the federal system for eight years, '! and to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would indicate a wasteful use of the
time and energy of the federal courts. Moreover, by tying the
issue of jurisdiction to bad faith alone, an element of uncertainty
46. Id. at 61.
47. 204 U.S. 321, 328 (1907).
48. 117 F. Supp. 781 (1953) The district court decided that the question whether a
corporation was in antagonistic hands was a question of fact, citing KVOS, Inc. v. Associated
Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936), and a trial should be necessary to determine this issue.
This statement has been attacked, as in Gratz v. Murchison, 130 F. Supp. 709 (D. Del.
1955) "Moreover, I find no case other than Smith v. Sperling holding realignment of the
corporation calls for a factual determination for jurisdictional purposes. An allegation in a
complaint the wrongdoer controls the corporation, I think, is determinative for jurisdictional
purposes since, in determining whether a cause of action is removahle, we look to the
plaintiff's pleadings which controls." See also 3 Moore Federal Practice, , 19.13 (Supp.
1955).
49. 117 F. Supp. 781, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
50. So. Pac. Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483 (1919) A dismissal for want of jurisdiction
is not res adjudicata" on the merits.
51. See note 16 supra at 1115.
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will obviously arise, in an area already confusing, and another
requirement of jurisdiction would exist where none is required
by. the Constitution.#
2
Conversely, cases in which the corporation is made plaintiff would
allow the suit to reach the federal courts where the citizenship
of the stockholder and the corporation is identical, and that of the
other defendants foreign, thus increasing jurisdiction in that class
of cases, though it is usually no problem to find an out of state
stockholder to institute suit.5"
The overall effect of the doctrine set forth in the Sperling and
Swanson cases in the lower courts would be to decrease the
amount of cases handled by the federal courts, "', and this is con-
sonant with a tendency to limit rather than to expand federal jur-
isdiction."o It would also be a method of aiding the courts in de-
termining collusion, e.g., to say that there is collusion of interests
whenever there exists only an honest difference of opinion between
th stockholder and his corporation. But in an effort to limit juris-
diction, the rule of the lower courts would result in denying a
stockholder the use of the federal courts where the citizenship
of the corporation and the other defendants is the same, and a
disloyal management hides behind an assumed 'attitude of strict
neutrality to the suit.
The dissent in the Sperling and Swanson cases, suggested by
the district court in the Sperling case; indicated a constitutional
objection to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, claiming that there
was not a "case or controversy" as required by article IIIf." Of
course, practical considerations would not justify the use of the
federal courts where jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship does not exist,. but that objection merely contemplates that
there will be no controversy between two indispensable parties, the
stockholder and the corporation. Should there be actual collusion,
it can be shown at any time during trial, and will go to defeat
jurisdiction at that point.57 Absent collusion, there is an actual
controversy between citizens of different states, and it would appear
52. U.S. Const. art III§ 2. As to whether there is a valid controversy, see J.R.A. Corp.
v. Boylan, 30 F. Supp. 393, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1939): "[When the corporation is antagon-
istic to the aims of the plaintiff stockholder, and refuses to enforce its rights, . . . this
refusal is it itself, a controversy to which the corporation is a real party defendant."
53. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Lavin v. Lavin, 182 F.2d 870 (2d
Cir. 1950).
54. 54 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1954).
55. Wechlser, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 216 (1948).
56. See note 28 supra at 1126.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1359.
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that this should stand regardless of whether the stockholder prays
for relief against the corporation or not. The only true objection to
diversity jurisdiction in stockholder's suits should be where the
element of collusion is present. Furthermore jurisdiction should be
determined from the pleadings not on the basis of conjectural bad
faith which only a trial on that issue could prove; 'an allegation
that the corporation has refused to sue to uphold rights the stock-
holder wishes to enforce should be sufficient to establish juris-
diction in the federal courts.
The rule unquestionably today is that a refusal by a corporation's
management based upon an honest difference of opinion is suf-
ficient to prevent realignment in stockholder's derivative suits
based upon diversity of citizenship, and is likewise sufficient to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b). To achieve
this result, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the test laid
down in dicta in numerous cases decided in the past century,
because that dicta could not be tailored to achieve a just and
practical result in an area where it was needed. No invasion of
the doctrine of stare decisis has taken place; rather, the Court has
reached a sensible result not contemplated by prior decisions.
GARRY A. PEARSON
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
IN NORTH DAKOTA
.Not too many centuries ago it was generally believed that evil
spirits were responsible for the illnesses that plague mankind.
Though the modem patient does not entertain that absurdity, his
state of enlightenment regarding the nature of the ailments that
beset him is but little advanced beyond that of his Stone Age
counterpart. Happily, however, the modern patient enjoys the
benefits of a vast fund of medical knowledge and a set of laws
assuring him, to a considerable degree, that those in whom he en-
trusts his health and life are possessed of that knowledge. It is with
these laws, the laws regulating the practice of medicine, that this
paper is concerned.'
1. General references include: Lott and Gray, Law in Medical and Dental Practice
(1942); Bangs, Christian Science Practice -Legality, 25 J. Crim. L. 271 (1934); Cald-
well, Early Legislation Regulating the Practice of Medicine, 18 IlI. L. Rev. 225 (1923);
Field, Nature of the A.M.A. Fight Against Quackery in Medicine, 9 Food, Drug, Cosmetic
L. J. 213 (1954); Grills, Regulation of the Practice of Medicine in the State of Michigan,
15 U. Detroit L. J. 42 (1952); Heilman, Medical Charlatanism, Legal Control of, 22
N. C. L. Rev. 23 (1943); Sears, Legal Control of Medical Practice; Validity and Methods,
44 Mich. L. Rev. 689 (1946).
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